Presidential Rally Data
I counted a campaign rally as any public event at which a candidate spoke to the public, regardless of the size of the audience. Church attendance and funerals were not included, unless the candidate addressed the crowd. Press conferences were not included, as these were geared toward the media, not a local audience.
It is important to address two possible concerns about bias in the campaign event data. One is that the newspapers might have covered rallies in urban areas more extensively than in hard-to-reach rural locations. Given that urban areas are more ethnically diverse, over-reporting of rallies held in urban centers could bias the data in favor of confirming the proposition that the leading candidates focus their campaign efforts outside their core ethnic strongholds. It seems unlikely, however, that this was the case. The newspapers relied on an extensive network of freelance writers who were stationed throughout the country and could be called upon to cover rallies in remote areas. For this reason, coverage of rallies in outlying areas is likely to have been on par with coverage of rallies in urban centers. Moreover, the data show that the papers had little trouble covering rallies outside Kenya's two major urban areas: only 16.5% (44 of 271) of mentioned rallies were held in the 12 constituencies that comprise Nairobi and Mombasa, Kenya's two largest cities.
A second concern is that the papers may have devoted more space to particular candidates. The data shows that the papers did report more rallies held by the incumbent president than the opposition challengers. Of the 271 coded rallies, the distribution across the candidates was as follows: Kibaki 49%, Odinga 29%, and Musyoka 25%. It is impossible to know whether this reflects bias on the part of the papers, or whether Kibaki actually held more rallies than the other candidates. What matters more than whether the papers covered the three candidates equally, however, is whether the papers exhibited any systematic bias in covering rallies in different types of areas. The argument outlined above is that the candidates focus their efforts on swing areas and avoid holding rallies in core areas. Thus, the critical concern regarding bias is whether the papers were more or less likely to cover rallies in core or swing areas. If the papers, for example, systematically under-reported rallies held in the parties' ethnic core areas, the tests would be biased in favor of confirming the hypothesis. I suggest, however, that the opposite was the case. When the parties held rallies in their strongholds or in opponents' strongholds, these rallies tended to be major events that were carefully watched by the media. By contrast, a rally in a swing area was more likely to be another in a long string of relatively similar events. Thus, to the extent that coverage may have been biased, the papers in all likelihood over-reported rallies in the parties' strongholds relative to the swing areas, biasing the data against confirming the argument outlined above. Figure A1 plots the district-level estimate created from survey data against the 1989 census data for all groups that make up more than 1% of the population (based on the 1989 census) and a residual other category. Given that the survey data was collected nearly 20 years after the 1989 census, I do not expect a perfect match. The plots show, however, that the survey estimates match the census data surprisingly well.
Constituency-level ethnicity estimates
As a second check, I plot the constituency-level estimates against the census data aggregated to the constituency level in 1989. However, because some constituency boundaries changed between 1989 and 2007, I am only able to include 157 out of 210 constituencies for this. Figure A2 plots the constituency-level estimated created from survey data against the 1989 census data for the three groups that had a co-ethnic candidate in the 2007 race and a residual other category. The relatively close fit between the survey estimates and the census dataaggregated both to the district and the constituency levelsuggests that it is reasonable to use survey data to estimate subnational ethnic demographics.
Figure A1. Comparison between Survey Estimates and Census Data at the District Level

Figure A2. Comparison between Survey Estimates and Census Data at the Constituency Level
Alternative definitions of ethnic areas
For the analysis of presidential rallies in Table 2 (shown graphically in Figure 1 ) I define the candidates' core co-ethnic areas as all parliamentary constituencies in which co-ethnics make up 75% or more of the population. The following tables replicate the analysis in Table 2 using alternative thresholds, 50% and 90%. The results are comparable to the estimates based on the 75% threshold, also shown here for ease of comparison. To examine whether the leading candidates converged in their pursuit of potential swing groups, the analysis in Figure 4 also uses 75% as a threshold to define ethnic areas.
The figures below replicate the analysis again using two alternative thresholds, 50% and 90%. The results using the 75% threshold area are again shown for ease of comparison.
The use of these alternative thresholds does not alter the conclusion that the leading parties converged on the same set of ethnic swing communities. 
Robustness tests:
I present a series of robustness tests that show that the analysis of presidential rallies in Table 3 is robust to a variety of alternative specifications:
o Table A4 uses districts instead of constituencies as the unit of analysis. The main results from Table 3 are unchanged. o Table A5 uses an alternative data source (the 2003 and 2008 Demographic and Health Surveys) to estimate the ethnic composition of parliamentary constituencies. The results are similar to those shown in Table 3 , though the coefficients for Kikuyu share in models 4 and 6 fall below conventional levels of statistical significance.
o Table A6 codes Kibaki's co-ethnic community as the Kikuyu, Meru, Embu bloc rather than only Kikuyus. The results are nearly identical to those presented in Table 3 . I do not re-estimate models 7 and 8, which are unchanged by this specification.
o Table A7 controls for accessibility. I include a dummy variable that measures whether constituencies can be accessed via Kenya's major roads. Unfortunately, data on road conditions is not available, so this variable is simply a dichotomous measure of whether the main highways or trunk lines run through each constituency. This variable is not significant in any of the models, and the main results from Table 3 are robust to the inclusion of this variable.
Table A4. Negative Binomial Regression Models of Presidential Rallies (districts as unit of analysis)
(1) Table A8 shows that at the start of the campaign the two leading candidates -Kibaki and Odinga -had already satisfied the "five-of-eight" rule which stipulated that to win the election in the first round a candidate needed at least 25% of the vote in five of Kenya's eight provinces. Table A9 re-estimates the main models of presidential rallies and includes a measure of ethnic fractionalization, created from the survey data used to estimate the ethnic composition of parliamentary constituencies. The coefficient on this variable is positive and significant in several models, suggesting that parties do target more diverse areas. More importantly, the main findings from Table 3 related to the targeting of campaign effort across core and swing groups are largely unaffected by the inclusion of the ethnic fractionalization measure, demonstrating that the main findings presented in Table 3 cannot be attributed to parties focusing on ethnically-diverse areas. Table A10 examines a variant of the argument that parties target areas where the vote is "split" at the start of the race. For this, I estimated voting intentions by constituency at the start of the campaign using data from a national survey conducted in early September, prior to the main period of campaigning. From this, I generated estimates of voting intentions by ethnic group. Then, to create constituency-level estimates of support for the candidates I multiplied the group-level data by the ethnic composition of each constituency. Finally, I created a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 for any constituency in which no candidate had more than 50% of the vote share at the start of the race. This measure provides a reasonable way of distinguishing areas where the vote is "split" from those where one candidate is dominant. I then replicate the main analysis of presidential rallies from Table 3 . The results in Table A10 indicate that while the "split constituencies" variable is significant in several models, the main findings on ethnic composition are largely unaffected by the inclusion of this variable. I interpret these results to mean that "split" areas are one type of swing area. But what makes these areas attractive targets is that they are inhabited primarily by groups that do not have a co-ethnic leader in the race, not the fact that they are ethnically diverse.
Alternative explanations
Institutions
Ethnic diversity
Moreover, the finding that the main measures of ethnic composition are robust to the inclusion of this measure indicates that swing areas also include more homogenous constituencies that are inhabited by a single group that does not have a co-ethnic in the race. 
Core mobilization as an alternative explanation
The results in Tables A11-A13 test whether the observed pattern of campaign rallies could be attributed to efforts to increase turnout among core supporters. I use a measure of average turnout in the two previous elections (1997 and 2002) . From this data, I create a dichotomous measure of areas with low turnout, defined as constituencies where average turnout in the two prior races was below the median (65%). I interact this turnout measure with the estimates of constituency-level vote shares for each candidate described in section 5.2 above. If the goal was core mobilization, I would expect that parties would target constituencies that were characterized by high levels of initial support and a history of low turnout. The results in Tables A11 do not support a core mobilization story; neither the low-turnout variable nor the interaction between vote share and low turnout is significant. Table A12 includes a continuous measure of turnout and likewise shows no evidence in favor of the mobilization story. Finally, Table A13 replicates the original analysis of rally targeting from the main text and shows that the key findings on ethnic composition are robust to the inclusion of the low turnout measure and its interaction with vote share at the start of the campaign. I interpret these results to mean that presidential aspirants did not use rallies to target existing supporters in low-turnout areas. While mobilization was important in the 2007 race, the broader results in the paper (including those that focus on household contact) suggest that the job of mobilizing the core is left to lower-level actors. 
